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EVIDENCE IN PROSECUTIONS

before he is found guilty of a second offense, and evidence of prior
convictions is introduced during the trial.
An increasing number of jurisdictions have adopted methods of
procedure under their habitual statutes which insure subsequent
offenders the same measure of protection afforded other defendants
in a criminal prosecution. Regardless of one's criminal past, a
man is nonetheless entitled to be tried for a new crime without
having his record used to prejudice his case before a jury. Illinois
should afford him such protection.
Abstracts of Recent Cases
Evidence Obtained By Illegal Search Admissible In State Court-In Irvine v.
California,74 Sup. Ct. 381 (1954), defendant was convicted of book-making
under the California anti-gambling laws. The proceeding was for a state
crime in a state court. The evidence against defendant consisted of the federal
gambling license (issued in accordance with the federal statute imposing a tax
on the business of gambling) and evidence illegally seized by police in the
following manner. A key was made to defendant's house. Then police bored
a hole in the roof of his home. Using the key they entered and installed a
microphone and attached it to a wire that ran through the hole in the roof to
a garage where officers listened in relays. Twice more they used the key to
enter the house in order to move the microphone into a closet and even the
defendant's bedroom where he and his wife slept. Finally, after listening for
more than one month, the police used the key to enter once more to arrest the
defendant. At no time were the officers in possession of a search warrant.
By the closest possible vote (four to affirm, one concurring, and four to reverse) the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction under the doctrine of Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Under the latter decision it was held "that
in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime the Fourteenth Amendment
does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search
and seizure." In the present case the defendant sought resort to the exception
to this rule embodied in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The defendant's claim was that the facts of his case were just as shocking to the
senses as were those in Rochin. The Court disagreed, however, stating that the
dividing line between Wolf and Rochin is clear: in the latter case there was
coercion upon the physical person. The instant case is like Wolf in that no
such coercion was involved. In this situation the Court reasserts the policy
factors lying behind the Wolf rule: namely, that since the chief burden of
administering criminal justice rests upon the state courts it would be an
unwarranted use of federal power to upset state convictions before the states
have had adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the federal rule excluding
illegally obtained evidence. Moreover, it would be unjustified to subject them
to the hazards of federal reversal for non-compliance with standards as to
which the Supreme Court itself has been so inconstant and inconsistent. The
defendant's other contentions were more summarily dismissed. Because a
microphone was used the Court held this was not a conventional wire-tapping
case and therefore there was no interference with the communications system
in violation of the Federal Communications Act. Also the federal act taxing
gambling provides that payment of the tax does not exempt any person from
punishment under state law. 53 STAT. 395, 26 U.S.C. §3276. As an alterna-
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tive solution two Justices suggested that the defendant resort to the Federal
Civil Rights Act for protection of his Constitutional rights. Justices Black
and Douglas dissented on the ground that the Wagering Act violated the
privilege against self-incrimination; Justices Frankfurter and Burton agreed
with the defendant's contention that another exception should be carved from
the Wolf doctrine; and Justice Douglas reasserted his belief that the Fourteenth Amendment should apply to bar evidence obtained by unlawful search
from state courts. Justice Clark reluctantly concurred on the ground that
certainty in the law should be maintained.
A Plea of Guilty May Be Withdrawn When Made Under Influence-Defendant pleaded guilty to a murder charge. After hearing evidence the court found
him guilty and imposed a sentence of death. Defendant sought a new trial
claiming that his plea was induced by the prosecutor's promise of leniency.
The state's attorney admitted that in a conversation with defense counsel he
stated that in his opinion only a plea of guilty could avoid a death penalty.
In reliance on this statement defense counsel advised defendant to make a
plea of guilty. On appeal held reversed, People v. King, 116 N.E. 2d 623 (Ill.
1953). The court admits the general rule that one who enters a plea of guilty,
hopeful of leniency, cannot withdraw the plea merely because he is dissatisfied
with the sentence imposed. However, where the death sentence is rendered,
justice and all humane considerations require that the plea be free from any
taint of misunderstanding, improper inducement by the prosecutor or anyone
else in authority over the prisoner. In light of the conversation between the
prosecutor and defense counsel the court concluded that it could not be said
that defendant's plea was made clearly free from influence.
Acquittal For Variance Between Indictment and Proof Does Not Constitute
Double Jeopardy-Defendant was indicted under a specific statute for
burning an occupied dwelling. A motion for acquittal was granted because
the state's proof dealt with the burning of an unoccupied house. Subsequently the grand jury returned another indictment for burning an unoccupied dwelling in violation of another specific statute. Defendant's appeal
from conviction on ground of double jeopardy was denied. State v. M1idgeley,
101 A.2d 51 (N.J. 1953). The court follows the prevailing rule that a person
has been placed in jeopardy when he has been put on trial on a valid indictment or information before a court of competent jurisdiction, and has been
arraigned and pleaded and a jury has been impanelled and sworn. But the
court also recognizes the exception to the rule that when a person is acquitted
on the ground of a material variance he cannot raise the plea of double
jeopardy. This exception seems sensible on either theory that (1) the new
indictment is for a different crime than charged in the first indictment or
(2) the defendant cannot be placed in double jeopardy since he could not
properly have been convicted upon the first indictment.
A Plea of Guilty to a Lesser Crime Than Charged in the Indictment Is
Acceptable-In People v. Carpenter, 1 Ill.2d 347 (1953), defendant was indicted for the crime of murder and when arraigned he pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently defendant sought and was granted permission to withdraw his
plea of not guilty and thereupon he pleaded guilty to the crime of manslaughter. After being found guilty defendant appealed, claiming he should
not have been allowed to change pleas since the indictment charged him with
murder. In affirming the court reasoned that since murder includes the lesser
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crime of manslaughter and that since a verdict of manslaughter would have
been valid under a trial for murder, then a plea of guilty to the lesser offense
is acceptable.
Instruction That Jury Might Find the Law as Well as the Facts Held Not
Prejudicial-Petitioner had been convicted of murder in 1929. Under the
Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act petitioner, Joyce, claimed that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to trial by jury because, at the state's
request, the jury had been instructed to decide the law as well as the facts.
The instruction was qualified by the statement that the jury could find the
law only if they could say upon their oaths that they knew the law better
than the court. The instruction was given under the authority of a former
statute (ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, §741 (1929)) providing that "juries in all
criminal cases shall be the judges of the law and the fact." Subsequent to
Joyce's conviction the Illinois Supreme Court held in People v. Bruner, 343
Ill. 146, that it was not error to deny the request of a defendant that the jury
be instructed to find the law because the statute violated the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers. The Bruner case, however, did not raise or
decide the question of denial of the right to trial by jury since it was the
defendant who sought the instruction. But here, since the state sought the
instruction, the question was squarely presented. The court ruled there was
no infringement of the right because there was no prejudicial error and therefore denied Joyce's petition. People v. Joyce, 1 Ill.2d 225 (1953). The court
reasoned that the instruction itself so limited the possibility of the jury's judging the law as to render the instruction harmless. Moreover, since the instruction was neutralized by others which correctly stated the applicable law, the
jury was in a position to find the petitioner guilty.
An Attempt To Commit A Crime Is Not Always A Crime-D e f e n d ants
appealed conviction of violating a statute prohibiting hunting in off-seasons.
In fact the defendants had shot a "stuffed," quite dead deer which had
been placed in a field by conservation men. Held reversed, State v. Guffey,
262 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1953). The court follows the hornbook rule that one
cannot be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime unless conviction for
the crime itself would follow if the attempt had been successful.
A Perjury Conriction May Follow Even If One Has Made False Statements
During A Trial That Was A Nullity-In United States v. Renington, 208 F.2d
567 (2d Cir. 1953), defendant was indicted and found guilty of perjuring
himself when answering the perennial question of communist affiliation. On
appeal Remington claimed the indictment should have been quashed because
of improprieties in the grand jury proceedings and, in the alternative, that
at the trial itself the charge to the jury was erroneous. The Second Circuit
reversed on the latter ground, leaving open the question of grand jury improprieties. The government, apparently in fear that there had been misconduct in the original indictment, did not proceed to a re-trial of the same
indictment; but rather it procured a new perjury indictment based on
Remington's statements made in defense at the first trial. After conviction
on the second indictment, Remington raised two ingenious contentions on
appeal. The principal argument was that perjurious statements made at a
trial under an illegally procured indictment cannot be subsequently prosecuted. This theory was based on a long line of cases holding that the government should be denied the fruits of its illegal conduct. See Nardone v.
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United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), and McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943). Remington's other contention, entrapment, was based on the
unique theory that by procuring the first indictment the government knew
defendant would have to make-and therefore he was incited to make-the
same statements at the trial, for if he did not take the stand it would have
been the equivalent of a plea of guilty. Assuming without deciding that
the original indictment was invalid, the court nevertheless affirmed the conviction. In overruling the first contention the court reasoned that there
was a new wrong committeed by the defendant in the presence of the court
and therefore there was jurisdiction over the second perjury. The doctrine
of entrapment was held inapplicable apparently on the ground that to hold
otherwise would make the defense available in every case of perjury where
the government questions a defendant. While Judge Learned Hand wrote
a persuasive dissent, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari. 22 U. S. LAw
WEEK 3209 (Feb. 9, 1954).
Admission Into Evidence of Coerced Confession Of One Defendant Does
Not Violate Constitutional Rights Of Co-defendant Who Is Implicated-The
coerced confession of one defendant, Gonzales, clearly implicated the two petitioners here. However, the trial court instructed the jury to the effect that
the confession was not to be used or considered as evidence against petitioners.
While the court reversed the conviction of Gonzales, it ruled that the admission of his confession did not violate due process as to the co-defendants.
Giron v. Cranor, 116 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Wash. 1953). The court was of the
opinion that this question had been settled by the Supreme Court in Malinski
v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945). In the latter case, however, somewhat more
protection was afforded the co-defendants in that before the coerced confession was introduced the co-defendants' names were stricken and "X" and
"Y" were substituted. Therefore there may be some question as to whether
this court went too far in interpreting the Malinskti opinion.

